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The Emotionalization of Reflexivity 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Reflexivity refers to the practices of altering one’s life as a response to knowledge 
about one’s circumstances. Whilst theories of reflexivity have not entirely ignored 
emotions, attention to them has been insufficient. These theories need emotionalising 
and this paper proposes that emotions have become central to a subjectivity and 
sociality that is relationally constructed. The emotionalization of reflexivity refers not 
just to a theoretical endeavour but is a phrase used to begin to explore whether 
individuals are increasingly drawing on emotions in assessing themselves and their 
lives. It is argued that dislocation from tradition produces a reflexivity that can be 
very dependent on comparing experiences and can move others to reflect and reorder 
their own relations to self and others. Thus emotions are crucial to how the social is 
reproduced and to enduring within a complex social world. 
 
Key words: detraditionalization, emotions, reflexivity, routine action, symbolic 
interaction 
 
Introduction 
 
The argument that follows is made in an unemotional and non-reflexive mode. Much 
sociology of emotions seems to similarly lack emotionality. Applying the highly 
rational register required by academic convention may not inevitably stifle emotional 
expression in writing, but it is very difficult to write academically and emotionally 
about emotions. Why this may be so requires another paper, but I begin with an 
apology for the lack of emotionality in this paper because it is an absence I would like 
the reader to keep in mind. What I have done is try to be clear, and it is perhaps that 
very effort at clarity which has washed away the flavour of the feelings which attend 
all our thinking, and which I here argue are crucial in making the social world within 
reflexive modernity.  
 
Reflexivity is a capacity via which individual and social lives are produced and 
changed as people react to their circumstances in ways no longer governed by 
tradition (Giddens, 1990). There has been considerable debate within sociology about 
the meaning and importance of reflexivity within the contemporary social world (e.g. 
Archer, 2007; Beck, 1992; Beck et al., 1994; Giddens, 1990). These debates have 
built upon philosophical engagements with the Cartesian dichotomization of reason 
and emotion. Despite this history, efforts to consider the emotional component of 
reflexivity have been limited. Highlighting reflexive emotionality will rescue 
definitions and explications of reflexivity from their over-focus on the cognitive and 
the individual. Instead I propose defining reflexivity as an emotional, embodied and 
cognitive process in which social actors have feelings about and try to understand and 
alter their lives in relation to their social and natural environment and to others. 
Emotions are understood not in terms of some that may retard reflection and some 
that may enhance it; rather reflexivity is thought to be more than reflection and to 
include bodies, practices and emotions. The first section establishes a starting point 
for this argument by showing how theories of reflexivity focused around 
detraditionalization and risk (Beck, 1992; 1994; Giddens, 1990; 1992) have 
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pessimistically highlighted fear as a response to the difficulties of making calculated 
choices within the uncertainty of modernity. Uncertainty renders habitual action 
unfeasible, but a wide range of emotions are drawn on to feed reflexive practices 
which continue to connect most individuals to each other (Archer, 2003; 2007). The 
emotional and relational component of reflexivity are outlined in the second section, 
where it is suggested that symbolic interactionism offers ways forward in thinking and 
researching. The final section sets out some intitial steps toward understanding the 
emotionalization of reflexivity as crucial in current processes of self and social 
(re)production. Comprehending emotionalization is vital to examining how 
contemporary subjects reflexively produce a sense of feeling, thinking and being in 
the world which relies on others. 
 
 
Reflexivity, Risk, Routine Action and Trust 
 
Theories of reflexivity do not adequately attend to emotions. One of the most 
influential of those theories has argued that a proliferation of risk has driven people 
towards reflexivity (e.g. Beck, 1992; 1994), but recognising a fear of risk is 
insufficient. Beck distinguishes between reflection as about knowledge, and implicitly 
rational choices, and reflexivity as the way people are forced into self-confrontation 
by social processes such as modernisation and individualisation. For Beck reflexivity 
is closely associated with risk assessment as individuals try to deal with risks, like the 
high risk of relationship break-up, which they cannot protect themselves against. 
However, fear is only one emotion attached to reflexivity and to what extent people 
are risk assessors in all areas of their lives is open to question (Elliott, 2002a: 300).    
 
A more humanly emotional view, going beyond the stark calculability associated with 
risk, can be generated by examining how reflexivity is positioned between the 
reproduction of self and of society (Elliott, 2002a: 300-301). Such a view can 
challenge Beck’s (1994) claim that reflection is about knowing, and not to be 
confused with reflexivity, which involves self-dissolution. For him reflexivity 
describes a reflection free reproduction and alteration of society via modernisation. 
This can make people reflect on the threats to self, but it does not inevitably do so. 
People have to modify their lives because of what is happening at the social level, but 
as Anthony Elliott (2002a: 302) argues that this may be more a ‘reflex’ than a result 
of reflection. Like Elliott, I doubt the distinction between reflection and reflexivity, 
suggesting that ‘reflection-free forms of societal self-dissolution’ (2002a: 302) cannot 
be separated from the individual’s ability to reflect. Social processes may have 
unintended consequences, but this does not mean that the reproduction of the social 
involves no reflection. Elliot’s work assists in establishing that thinking feeling (not 
just fearing) agents play a part in social reproduction but the relationship between 
reflective and routine actions requires further investigation. 
 
Detraditionalization describes the shift away from tradition as a guide to life (Giddens 
1990); and while not total (Adkins, 2000; Gross, 2005; Thompson, 1995) it means 
that people deal frequently with unfamiliar situations in which they cannot rely on 
calculation nor on habitual nor routine actions. Uncertainty is thus intrinsic to 
modernity and makes rational choices based on the probability of certain outcomes 
unfeasible. When there are so many unknown factors in play, it is almost impossible 
to predict what is likely to be the ‘best’ outcome. Additionally the pace of change 
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means that practices cannot be passed down, for example children show their parents 
how to operate computers. The complex division of labour also makes people reliant 
on experts to translate and evaluate knowledge claims. Some of the key work on 
reflexivity, has thus called into question Bourdieu’s (e.g. 1987) claims about the 
centrality of habitus in the reproduction of the social, but with little to say on 
emotions. Margaret Archer (2003, see also 1993), for example is supportive, in 
theoretical terms, of Beck and Giddens in so far as they highlight the demise of 
routine action. Archer claims that routine action cannot be resorted to except for a 
reduced number of tasks like cleaning one’s teeth or crossing the road. However, this 
relies on a definition of habit as not conscious cognition. Current understandings of 
neural processes indicate that decisions might be made and stored to be acted on later 
using reflexes (Elder-Vass, 2007). This indicates the need to rethink what constitutes 
routine action by blurring the demarcation between conscious reflection and 
supposedly sub or unconscious habitual reflexes. The complex implications of this for 
non-essentialist understandings of bodies and emotions can only be hinted at here, 
under the rubric of agency. 
 
To consider reflexivity as emotional and bodily is a step towards rethinking agency 
without rational/emotional dualism. For this purpose Archer’s ideas about agency are 
helpful in relocating it as a practice of actual human beings living together in the 
world. This requires departing from Beck, Giddens and associated theorists (see Beck 
et al., 1994), who conflate structural effects with the powers of individual agents. For 
example, Archer (2007) argues that in Reflexive Modernisation Beck et al. (1994) are 
deceptive in seeming at first to attribute reflexivity to systems, but later say that 
systems cannot be reflexive, only people. For Archer (2007) reflexivity is the mental 
capacity of people to consider themselves in relation to their social contexts and their 
social contexts in relation to themselves. This position allows that Beck, Giddens and 
Lash do have a compelling argument about growing reflexivity, but she finds them 
unable to deal adequately with reflexivity as a phenomenon. The most useful aspect of 
Archer’s criticism is her attempt to replace their vision of individual subjectivity as 
capricious, a constant reinvention in which uncertainty means that people cannot react 
rationally in relation to the potential consequences of actions. The problem with her 
solution is that evoking ‘rational’ reactions is limiting in allowing for a more 
emotional, yet not capricious, vision of agency. In illuminating the ‘internal 
conversation’ as mediating between structure and agency, Archer does suggest that 
such a conversation entails emotions. Most particularly, she argues that the ‘long-
running internal conversation that shapes our life projects’ is one that is ‘an emotional 
matter of finding the particular project attractive enough to see it through and to bear 
the costs of subordinating other interests to it’. She is adamant that it would be ‘a 
serious error’ to see the internal conversation as ‘purely cognitive’ (Archer, 2003: 
101-2). Nevertheless, in making central the cognitive deliberations that she regards as 
crucial to that conversation, the part that emotions play remains less well elaborated. 
The nod towards emotions is also somewhat obscured by her insistence that we are 
talking to ourselves and not, as Mead suggests, to society in the form of some 
generalized other. Such a position means that she considers the most important 
relations to be ‘those that obtain between the mind and the world’ (Archer, 2003: 94). 
Her criticism of Mead relies on reading his theory of the generalized other as over-
socialised in portraying this other as an internalised version of societal expectations. 
However, Mead can be read as offering a version of self as continually shaped in and 
through actual, as well as imagined, interaction with others - including versions of our 
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self. It is not only conversations with and about ‘others’ that are crucial, but embodied 
practices and feelings. The reflexive self is formed by emotional relations to others 
and thus emotions play a more complex part in deliberations than helping us form and 
maintain commitments to our projects. 
 
The position taken here envisages reflexivity as involving a kind of emotional agency 
that is relational and therefore involves issues of trust. According to Giddens (1990: 
30) reflexivity extends to all areas of social life and is ‘deeply unsettling’ because 
knowledge is constantly being revised and there is no certitude on which to base 
actions. Giddens (1990) argues that trust has become essential to sociality because of 
the disembedding mechanisms of modernity and the uncertainty they produce. 
However, he maintains that trust becomes invested in abstract capacities rather than 
people. This does not account for the fact that in many situations we are forced to 
make decisions in the face of conflicting truth claims from a variety of experts. Trust 
may often be a matter of putting faith in one person rather than another. This is a kind 
of emotion work (Hochschild, 1983) based around trust. Trust in the contemporary 
world is often necessarily based largely on emotions, on feelings about things and 
activities, or an aesthetic: a liking for a person, persons or thing. 
 
The concept of aesthetic reflexivity can be extended to better comprehend reflexivity 
as emotionalised. Lash’s (1993; see also Beck et al., 1994; Lash and Urry, 1994) 
conceptualisation of aesthetic reflexivity is a more embodied version of reflexivity 
than Beck and Giddens’s, involving the interpretation of aesthetic symbols (Lash and 
Urry, 1994: 112). This theory examines the conditions under which aesthetic 
reflexivity arises and how the consumption of cultural objects under those conditions 
is often likely to produce isolated individuals rather than individualised reflexive 
subjects. This assumes that relations to others are disrupted by the dominance of 
feelings for things, but human relations –even poor ones, must be maintained within a 
social world. If an aesthetic includes the liking and disliking of other people (as 
Bourdieu and followers suggest) then those human relations can be seen as central to 
reflexive practices. 
 
 
 
Reflexivity, Emotion and Relationality 
 
Relationality is the key phenomenon to explore in order to grasp whether there has 
been an emotionalization of reflexivity and what this might mean. Reflexivity is an 
achievement that describes the mediatory process via which people react to the 
situations they find themselves in. Through this process people attempt to find ways 
through the world and a place in it. They hope that within that place they might be 
able to exercise some control and to be the kind of person that they want to be, within 
the roles available to them. These reflexive processes involve relational struggles. 
How and why people feel committed to their concerns is a matter of emotional 
relations to other things and people (Archer, 2003; 2007)1.  
 
Feelings about and connections to others are crucial to reflexive practices, even within 
a climate of individualisation. Reflexive commitment to projects fundamentally 
involves how we relate to others, as Archer (2003) has shown.  These relations do not 
inevitably necessitate individual ego mastery as Giddens has proposed, but can be 
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understood in terms of the subject as split and as fundamentally a product of 
intersubjectivity (Elliott, 2002b). However, this psychoanalytic tradition tends to 
perceive emotion as ‘raw material’ (Elliott, 2002b: 106) to be processed into thoughts. 
Intersubjectivity is a promising notion but full appreciation of sociality is lost because 
of the implication that emotions are an interior property of individuals.  
 
Emotions are social, but countering perceptions of emotions as interior requires 
sociological attention to the interactional nature of the self as set out in symbolic 
interactionism. Symbolic interactionism is a way of thinking about how our selves 
and social worlds are formed via the meanings we give to them and to the actions of 
others, and Mead is typically defined as the key founder (see Plummer, 1991). 
Emotional versions of the constitution of self and the social can be traced in 
developments of Mead (1962). Denzin (1984) is of the Meadian tradition, drawing 
together social, philosophical, psychological and sociological attempts to understand 
emotion as self-feeling. He proposes that ‘[a]ll emotions are relational phenomena’ 
(Denzin, 1984:52). Even if they do not originate in the self, emotions refer back to it.  
This makes sense within the Meadian view of the self as constructed through 
interaction with others. However, Denzin’s version of this view also draws heavily on 
Jean-Paul Sartre and thus centres consciousness in its understanding of self and 
emotion: 
 
Emotional is the term to be given to a particular mode of consciousness and of 
being-in-the-world. It is not a term to be applied to the sensations one 
attributes to interior bodily states and feelings. Emotion must be studied from 
within consciousness, not in terms of physiological processes or unconscious 
mechanisms. The study of emotion must be located in the interaction process, 
for all forms of emotionality arise from the interactions the person has with 
himself and others in the world (Denzin, 1984: 48). 
 
Although the importance of the relational is clear in much sociology of emotions2 it 
often places too much emphasis on the cognitive and conscious aspects of 
emotionality. 
 
Symbolic interactionism offers a model of a feeling self that is socially embedded, but 
it needs developing. The social construction of emotions has been established within 
social psychological traditions akin to symbolic interactionism (see Harré and Parrott, 
1996). Key scholars like James Averill (e.g. 1996: 217, 224) have shown that 
emotions cannot be definitively linked to physiological states and that ‘most standard 
emotional reactions are social constructions’. Arlie Hochschild has been largely 
responsible for developing such ideas within a sociological framework. She is heavily 
influenced by symbolic interactionism and her concept of emotion work can provide 
some purchase in establishing the importance of emotions in reflexive practices that 
are relational (Hochschild, 1983). The problem is that she departs from symbolic 
interactionism in her evocation of a real self. This limits exploration of the emotional 
component of relationality and the relational component of emotionality. For 
Hochschild, emotions are not ‘naturally’ occurring physiological events, but are 
sensations that we manage according to socially determined rules about emotional 
expression. ‘Feeling rules’ set out the norms of emotional behaviour in various 
situations; for example, we are expected to feel sad at funerals and will work on our 
emotions until we do. Her ideas about feeling rules provide a valuable way to think 
 7 
about how emotions are shaped, and in fact constructed, by social conditions. She 
goes on to argue that within capitalism emotion work has become increasingly 
commercialized (see also Hochschild, 2003) as emotional labour, which is emotion 
work done in exchange for a wage (Hochschild, 1983). Both in emotion work and in 
emotional labour some individuals will use ‘surface acting’ to conform to feeling 
rules, but most will opt for ‘deep acting’, whereby they convince themselves that they 
feel a certain way. Hochschild’s concern is that by deep acting to follow social rules 
for emotional expression, people will lose touch with their own emotions and become 
alienated. She worries about the effects of current social conditions on ‘relations to 
the “real self”’ (Hochschild, 1990: 119). This evoking of a ‘real self’ loses one of the 
most potentially helpful insights from symbolic interactionism. For Mead (1962: 142), 
and the majority of those following in this tradition, there are ‘all sorts of different 
selves answering to all sorts of different social reactions’ Such a fragmented model of 
self can better capture the contemporary struggles of individuals in shaping their lives 
in accordance with others. 
 
As social productions, fragmented selves engage with changing and contested 
emotional styles. There have been debates about whether social change has brought 
an ‘emotional cooling’ (Hochschild, 2003; Stearns, 1994) to social life or whether 
there has been a shift toward more informal and perhaps ‘warmer’ emotional styles 
since the 1960s (Wouters, 2004). However, people must reflexively engage or 
disengage with shifting rules as they relate to others within different contexts. 
Important questions remain about what kinds of people might be better able to use 
feeling rules effectively, whatever the dominant style. In pursuing these questions 
Mead’s approach can be drawn on to break down dualist oppositions of cognitive 
reason versus bodily emotions. This enables a conception of emotions as complexes 
with bodily, discursive and relational elements (Burkitt, 1997). The notion of 
‘reflexive embodiment’ (Crossley, 2007), also usefully employs ideas from symbolic 
interactionism to theorise how we reflect and work upon our bodies; but again 
emotions need more attention. Burkitt (1997: 41) rightly argues that in considering 
emotions it is important to avoid a common sense division often fallen into by 
sociologists, between emotions as inner individual events that are then socially 
expressed or managed. Emotions are produced within relationships and their 
associated social and linguistic practices. This is a model of emotions as ‘learned 
bodily responses or dispositions’ (Burkitt, 1997: 43), with feeling and thought arising 
simultaneously. Emotions are felt and done within relations to other people and 
things. Emotional interactions are not necessarily irrational and are open to 
interpretation. However, emotions are not simply managed, but can emerge in ways 
that are overwhelming.  Reflection may follow, but can also produce, emotional 
reflexes. Reflexivity is therefore not just an ‘internal conversation’, in the way Archer 
(2003) proposes in her development of Mead, it is a juggling of emotions within 
imagined and real interactions, in which interpretation can be difficult.  
 
It is difficult to measure empirically whether interpretation of other’s and one’s own 
emotions has become more crucial within people’s reflexive practices, and more 
research is needed. People may often be unaware of or unable to articulate the 
sometimes tangled emotions that fuel and emerge from everyday interactions. In 
developing methods of researching an emotionalization of reflexivity it should be 
noted that the epistemological/methodological usage of ‘reflexivity’ has a slightly 
different emphasis than when theoretically employed. Within sociological 
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methodology reflexivity is usually characterised as attention to the ‘problem’ of how 
researchers are related to those they study (see Denzin, 1994; Mauthner and Doucet, 
2003). However, reflexivity is not simply a consideration of relationality, but about 
how the social is reproduced. Although relations are absolutely central in that 
reproduction, methodology often oversimplifies, over-rationalizes and over-
personalises those relations. Mauthner and Doucet (2003) note that what is reflected 
upon is simply researcher-participant power relations within the interview or 
ethnographic encounter; little attention is given to the relations of analysis. The point 
about analysis may be valid, but many ethnographies and other methodological 
accounts may now attach too much, rather than not enough, importance to evaluating 
the researcher’s emotional responses to participants and in considering his or her 
institutional and interpersonal contexts as informing that analysis. Research accounts 
do not de-centre the researcher as much as could be fruitful and often little is said 
about the (emotional) reflexivity of the participants. 
 
There is some empirical evidence that interpreting emotions is important for 
reflexivity, which hints at people’s varying competence in acquiring emotional 
reflexivity. Debra King (2006) has investigated the teaching of emotional reflexivity 
within social movements because it is thought crucial in enabling political actors to 
bring change. She has also looked at organisational encouragement of people’s 
emotional skills (King, 2007). For instance, there was a fad at the turn of the twenty-
first century for encouraging managers to learn ‘emotional intelligence’ (see 
Goleman, 1996) to help them understand the needs of their staff and manage in a 
more caring fashion (e.g. Ryback, 1997). The supposedly gendered distribution of 
emotional expertise (Parsons and Bales, 1956) is being disrupted and migration of the 
‘expressive’ private into the ‘instrumental’ world of work is recommended. Yet the 
instrumental is also invading the intimate sphere, whilst women remain not so much 
valued for emotional skills but overloaded with emotion work and labour 
(Hochschild, 2003). That doing emotions ‘well’ is a matter of work, not just a 
socialised skill, is an important insight from Hochschild (Lutz, 1996: 162). However, 
people come to emotion work differently prepared and this is perhaps some indication 
that ‘emotional capital’ may be more and more vital to maintaining or achieving 
privilege. Helga Nowotny (1981) developed sociological usage of ‘emotional capital’ 
as a concept and Reay (2004: 60) explains that it is a variant of social capital 
‘generally confined within the bounds of affective relationships of family and friends 
and encompasses the emotional resources you hand on to those you care about’. Bev 
Skeggs (1997; 2005) has provided highly compelling illustrations of how emotions 
are not just resources employed in the private sphere, but used and felt within the 
often very public reproduction of class, gender and whiteness. Forming a valued self 
is often emotionally painful for white working class women given the disrespect to 
which they are routinely subjected; yet this is but one example of the emotionality and 
relationality of reflexive processes. It is clear that understanding social and self 
reproduction can benefit from attention to emotions. Notably, Bourdieu’s work has 
been central to many of these empirical attempts to see how emotions may be 
involved in this reflexive reproduction. It is compelling work but the reliance on 
Bourdieu raises the problems already noted of dealing with the fact that habituated 
forms of action have limited significance within reflexive modernity. Again symbolic 
interactionism offers some promising alternative ideas. 
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In examining the emotionalization of reflexivity as relational Mead’s concept of the 
generalized other has potential. Holdsworth and Morgan (2007) propose making more 
use of it to do sociology within the ‘ethical turn’. They argue that the generalized 
other is a process by which people incorporate notions of what others say, think and 
do into their judgements. If this is extended to include what others feel, it could be 
highly useful for the sociology of emotion. Fundamentally the self is constantly 
constructed and reconstructed in ongoing relations to others. The next section sets out 
some initial steps towards a model of reflexivity as emotionalised within these 
relations to others. 
 
 
 
The Emotionalization of Reflexivity 
 
Emotions are core to reflexive processes. They are integral to reasoning and reasoning 
involves invoking and engaging with embodied and abstract versions of a generalized 
other. Tradition may retain some role in people making sense of themselves and their 
lives (Adkins, 2000; Gross, 2005; Thompson, 1995) but much reflexivity is guided by 
real and imagined dialogue with what others think, do and feel. The reproduction of 
the social is always incomplete in that it is never exact. Alteration occurs and spaces 
for the new emerge. Yet at the individual level it is difficult to assess to what extent 
changes are ‘reflex’ responses to the impact of social conditions or choices made 
having reflected upon those conditions.  
 
Changing social conditions impact across various social spheres and although people 
draw upon tradition they sometimes face novelty with feelings of excitement and 
possibility, not just a fear of risk.  This is arguably most evident within intimate life; 
the sphere in which reflexivity has been expected to involve emotions and concern for 
others (see Hochschild, 2003), but now within a framework of individual choice 
(Giddens, 1992). Amongst this seeming contradiction it is possible to begin to tease 
out whether and how the interpretation of emotions is central to a reflexivity which 
shapes connected selves and the social world. As intimate lives diversify relations 
even to those closest cannot be taken for granted and must be made (Budgeon and 
Roseneil, 2004; Roseneil, 2005; Weeks et al., 2001). The emotional and relational 
element of reflexive practices is most obvious when they are concerned with love and 
care, but is evident in work (Hochschild, 2003), class relations (Skeggs, 1997; 2005), 
political activism (King, 2006), education (Reay, 2005) and no doubt other arenas. 
Quite how emotions are involved needs further thought. 
  
Those moved or compelled beyond traditional blueprints for living are forced to be 
more reflexive in ways requiring assessment of and responses to emotions if they are 
to maintain relations to others. In particular, increased geographical mobility can 
bring fragility to human bonds (Bauman, 2003). For many individuals frequent moves 
are brought about by globalized economies that rely on individualised mobile workers 
(see Gerstel and Gross, 1984; Green, 1997). For those who shift away from familiar 
places and people there is likely to be an especial awareness of the lack of opportunity 
for emotional intimacy with others (see Baldassar et al., 2007; Holmes, 2004). 
However people are often creative in dealing with this lack. They conduct ‘life 
experiments’ (Weeks at al., 2001), described by those involved as often difficult but 
also as playful, exciting and/or liberating in many ways (e.g. Budgeon and Roseneil, 
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2004; Gross and Simmons, 2002; Holmes, 2004; Levin, 2004). Not only within 
intimate life, but in other spheres people do not always quickly move on to new loves, 
jobs, ideas, or ways of living if currently experiencing dissatisfactions. Often there is 
perseverance and the development of new ways of interacting which are in some 
cases more emotionally satisfying (see for example King, 2006; Reay, 2005). 
Reflexivity is not simply a rational calculation of the amount of satisfaction an aspect 
or way of life brings, but infused with feelings about how it fits (or does not) with 
others and what they think, feel and do. Reflexivity is emotional and comparative and 
relies on interpreting emotions. 
 
Not everyone is equally competent or ‘successful’ in their emotional practices, but 
developing Mead’s ideas about selves as constituted in relation to others is potentially 
more useful than the Bourdieusian inspired concept of emotional capital. Reflexivity, 
if thought of in emotional terms, can change participants’ relations with others and 
change how they feel. The exigencies of lives within modernity often create confusion 
and guilt. If connection to others is a matter for design, not tradition, then there are 
many possibilities but few guidelines. Making one’s own life comprehensible and 
meaningful is achieved to some degree through comparison to others. Where some 
equanimity is achieved by those doing things differently it is reached partly via 
critical attitudes to normalised traditional ways of living, and partly by recognition of 
fellow trailblazers. Whilst aware of the limitations of new forms of living, those in 
them do not appear to see them as inevitably disconnected and tragic (e.g. Budgeon 
and Roseneil, 2004; Weeks at al., 2001). Yet more work is needed in order to 
understand how emotions are involved in reflexivity. The more people reflexively 
question their actions and depart from tradition, the more difficult it is for sociologists 
to “measure” and discuss the resulting diversity, ambivalence and complexity3. This 
does not mean that nothing can be done, but that the conceptual and empirical tools 
for looking at emotional life need honing. 
 
Emotions have sensational aspects not always easy to translate into discourse, even – 
or perhaps especially- for those experiencing them. Knowing about and making sense 
of other people’s feelings is also far from straightforward if it is assumed that people 
are engaged in surface and/or deep acting as Hochschild suggests. This problem is 
somewhat eased by avoiding the idea of a ‘real’ self and ‘real’ emotions which must 
be uncovered. Then the issue is more one of capturing and interpreting expressions of 
emotion in a phenomenological fashion (see Denzin, 1984), but this may give only a 
partial picture of what is conscious and cognitive. In emotional reflexivity affectivity 
occurs within conditions in which cognitive reasoning is still highly valued. 
Individuals are expected to account for their actions, but emotional self-accounting is 
arguably more recent and less sophisticated. Within actual therapy and popular 
environments like talk shows or reality television, people confess/express their shame, 
anger and love. Foucault (1990/1978) argues that the confessional has a long history, 
but that history illustrates that the interpretation of feelings has been considered 
something that requires help from an ‘expert’. Some of the empirical work noted 
suggests that a shift is occurring such that people are expected to skill themselves in 
emotional reflexivity. Now individials are expected to know and articulate how they 
feel. If they turn to ‘experts’ on emotions, there are a bewildering variety from which 
to choose. Most experts regard emotions as something to be managed by individuals, 
rather than as interactional productions. Yet reflexivity is ever more likely to require, 
as well as evoke, interpretations of others’ emotions as well as one’s own.  
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The ability to interpret one’s own and others emotions ‘successfully’ is not about 
recognizing authentic versus managed emotions but about being able to engage in 
meaningful ways with the emotional ups and downs of living within a complex and 
uncertain world. Whether and which types of individuals are equipped to deal with 
this emotionalization of reflexivity, how they might go about it, and its consequences 
are in urgent need of further theoretical and empirical attention. 
 
 
 
Concluding Reflections 
 
Detraditionalization, even if limited in some areas, has led to less reliance on routine 
action and a turn to reflexivity. Yet reflexivity remains unsettling because arising 
from uncertainty. Individuals are forced to rely on trust, not just in the abstract 
capacities of systems, but in people making knowledge claims. The difficulty is that 
the specialisation of knowledge makes deciding between competing knowledge 
claims difficult. Within a complex world a person does not usually have the 
knowledge required to make a fully reasoned decision. Not only does this make their 
deliberations fallible (Archer, 2003) but they often have to rely on feelings. Feelings 
of trust or liking or pleasure, or their opposites, frequently guide reflexive practices.  
 
Thus emotions have become crucial in the reproduction of selves within/as the social. 
However, it is difficult to know and study the emotional dynamics involved in 
evaluating self relative to others within the diversity arising from detraditionalization. 
Emotional reflexivity may be increasingly necessary to the formation of self and 
sociality, but to what extent and how various social groups are engaged in emotional 
evaluation is open to further question. 
 
To recognize reflexivity as emotionalised is to see that interpreting one’s own and 
others emotions is increasingly necessary. Being good at emotion work does not 
automatically bring social success, because emotional reflexivity is not simply a 
matter of individuals exercising skills. Emotions are done in interaction with others, 
they involve bodies, thought, talk and action. Feelings make embodied social selves 
and selves and lives are made within the social constraints of place and time. It is 
crucial to attempt to better understand these emotional reflexive practices within a 
sociological context. There is further work needed on how reflexivity is emotionalised 
in order for sociologists to make sense of how and why some people are better able to 
feel their way in a rapidly changing world.  
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Notes 
 
1  Archer (2003) does explore varying degrees of the importance of relations to 
others in forming certain individuals’ reflexive modes. She outlines four 
different reflexive types: communicative, autonomous, meta, and fractured 
reflexives. Communicative reflexives are described as most connected to 
(proximate) others in their projects of self and social creation and fractured 
reflexives least connected. However relation to others is a matter of degree, 
and an air of mystery remains around why individuals with similar 
backgrounds might adopt more or less ‘distant’ relational reflexive modes. 
More attention to emotionality can potentially provide further clarity. 
 
2  Theodore Kemper (e.g. 1978) also has a relational view of emotions, but 
within structuralist rather than microsociological traditions, and arguably less 
helpful in a consideration of reflexivity. Kemper argues that emotions are 
created via social relations of power and status between actors. His Weberian 
definition of power as ‘the ability to realize one’s will even over the 
opposition of others’ (Kemper 1990: 211) is limited for addressing the 
complexities of agency within reflexive modernity. Conceptualisations of 
power as a quantity have been rejected by poststructuralists such as Foucault 
(e.g. 1990). Foucault suggests that  power is not simply held or lacked by 
people but is productive of them as subjects, and of the relations between 
them. Power is not a thing, but a process and there is always resistance. 
Kemper’s work is important in seeing how emotions are externally imposed; 
but does not consider that emotions may determine or change relations. 
 
3  The usual quantitative tools, in particular, are designed for a reality which 
does not always correspond to people’s lives. For instance, research in the UK, 
US and Australia on different forms of geographical mobility shows that most 
professional couples spend time living away from their partner at some point 
(Bell, 2001; Green, 1997: 646; Guldner, 2003). However, there are a paucity 
of good statistics on couples who live apart together (LATs) (although see 
Guldner, 2003; Haskey, 2005; Levin, 2004). Many large surveys have only 
recently included questions about whether people have a relationship with 
someone in another household (Ermisch, 2000). Even where these surveys do 
include such questions the results are not easy to interpret. For example, the 
latest Australian Survey of Social Attitudes includes the question: “Do you 
live together with a partner?” It might be expected that those who answered no 
to this, but gave their marital status as married or de facto (not separated or 
divorced), might have partners living in other households. However, later 
there is a question asking people to list the other members of their household, 
and over eighty per cent of those who said they did not live together with a 
partner gave “partner” as the second person in their household (Wilson et al., 
2006). It may be that these are distance relationships in which the partner 
commutes to work away during the week, or for longer periods. When people 
say they do not live with their partner, they may mean they do not usually live 
with them. When asked who else is in their household they include their 
partner, even if their partner is often elsewhere. However, it is also possible 
that people have not filled in the questionnaire properly. Thus it cannot be said 
for certain whether these are LATs, but it does raise interesting questions 
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about whether many household surveys fail to capture the complexity of 
people’s living arrangements, especially if they are non-conventional. It also 
raises questions about the reflexive processes that people go through in trying 
to report on and make their intimate, emotional lives. 
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